With entertainment, tension, five goals and a red card, you feel like the Grinch who stole Christmas talking about anything but these things after the Big Blue. For Melbourne Victory however every game this season has had talking points – derbies and old rivalries, the departure of Ange Postecoglou, the reencounter with Ernie Merrick – that have overshadowed the fact that their 4-2-2-2 system has both glaring faults and obvious strengths.
With a 4-0 mauling in round two at the hands of Brisbane Roar, so ended 'Rado's Revolution'. For the Sydney-Victory match, out was the 4-3-3 that Sydney's assistant coach had built and practised over pre-season, and in was the 4-2-3-1. The absence of Alessandro Del Piero was certainly telling in the Sydney derby and against Perth, but with the Italian back pulling the strings in the No10 role, it was a much better use of the former Juve man's legs than leading the line and led to a more potent Sydney FC.
Postecoglou has built an intriguing tactical formation – unseen in the history of the A-League. And despite its positives there remain two key challenges for Melbourne's 4-2-2-2. Firstly, how to dominate the midfield battle; and secondly, how to neutralise attacking full-backs.
Facing a 4-2-3-1 or a 4-3-3, Melbourne’s two holders can easily find themselves isolated or overrun in a basic 3 v 2. Photograph: Graphic
Against the Roar, McKay, Miller and Brattan dictated the midfield battle – the Roar had 57% possession and their midfield trio made 127 completed passes to Milligan and Broxham's 75. Such was Brisbane's control, had Brattan not gone off injured, it's arguable the visitors could well have ended the night as winners.
Secondly, the narrowness of the 4-2-2-2 leaves vast gaps out wide, and when facing attack-minded full-backs (especially from teams that have a 3 v 2 dominance in midfield) – these become crucial zones from which to build attacks. Hence, against both Brisbane and Wellington, the Victory ceded crucial territory and attacking momentum to the full-backs: Hingert and Stefanutto, and Caira and Fenton respectively.
Not only does this present opportunities to the opposition, but it also blunts a key aspect of the Victory's attacking strategy. With the Melbourne wide men having to follow the runs of full-backs, this not only deprives the team of two key attacking outlets, but nullifies the whole system of movement between the wide men and the dual No10s that gives the 4-2-2-2 its greatest strength.
The result against Sydney turned not on tactical points, but on individual brilliance, fortune and recklessness – all the special facets that give football its ensemble of heroes and villains.
Sydney's three goals had more than a slice of fortune – Garcia pouncing on a misjudged header, and a keeper rushing off their line; Seb Ryall with an inadvertent nosed-goal; and a penalty earned through one marquee's experience and awareness (Del Piero), and another's baffling lack of (Contreras).
In Melbourne's two goals however we saw the very best that their 4-2-2-2 system has to offer.
Goal 1 (Thompson 17'): The inside-to-outside run that acts as a foil for the outside-to-inside run.
With Melbourne’s ‘dual No10s’ making an initial run wide, it lures out the central defenders, and creates space for the wide men making the opposite run. Photograph: Graphic
Key to Melbourne's attacking movement is an initial run made by the 'dual No10s' from a central position towards the sideline. With Traore over the ball (and Sydney not able to press, with Ryall off the pitch) the run from Nichols captures the eye of Sydney's centre defender, Tiago. He's drawn initially further apart from his partner Petkovic, but also forward, to cover a potential ball to Nichols's feet. As a secondary movement, Pain, starting from the sideline cuts across Emerton, who leaves the run for his centre defender. With Tiago drawn in the wrong direction, the lofted ball from Traore sets up a simple footrace. With Thompson anticipating this sequence much better than Warren (or Petkovic) it's a simple tap in, following a fine flowing move.
Goal 2 (Troisi 24'): The positioning of the deep-lying 'striker' draws defenders too high, leaving space behind for the quick wide player.
With wide players higher up the pitch than ‘strikers’, it creates a crucial attacking space behind central defenders. Photograph: Graphic
Technically, the second goal was a deflected free kick – so not much Sydney FC could do about that. But the passing movement that led to the freekick (and Warren's sending off) was a classic example of Melbourne's attacking movement.
The sequence starts with an excellent one-on-one win from Traore – he picks out a retreating Archie Thompson, who in turn finds Troisi, with Sydney FC struggling to transition back to defence. Rather than trying to sprint past the defensive line, Nichols holds a deep-lying position that draws Petkovic higher up the field than desired. Nichols waits for the defender to commit himself, plays a well-weighted first-time ball bisecting the two FC defenders, once again putting Pain through for a one-on-one footrace.
With a classic No9 striker (think Juric or Berisha) in the formation, centre defenders are able to remain – as they prefer – to be the deepest defenders. With twin 'false No9s' or 'dual No10s', it's the ability, especially of Nichols, to move defenders out of position that unlocks defensive lines.
To see this movement in action again, re-watch Melbourne's third goal against Wellington, or their goal against Brisbane. On both occasions the centre defender (Sigmund and North) is forced to leap out of the line to close down a deep-lying 'striker' with the ball, allowing the pacy Troisi to get in behind for a one-on-one with the keeper.
Trailing 3-2, and having failed to breakdown a ten-men defence not famed for its solidity, in the 69th minute Kevin Muscat tellingly switched to a 4-3-3; sacrificing the defensive-minded Broxham for the creativity of Gui Finkler.
With tough road trips to both the West Sydney Wanderers and the Central Coast Mariners ahead it will be fascinating to see if Muscat persists with the system he's inherited, or whether the two key vulnerabilities of Melbourne's 4-2-2-2 sees him sacrifice its attacking strengths.
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